April 1, Bahrain raised the price of natural gas for industrial use by $0.25 per million British thermal units (mmBTU), in addition to a 25 percent hike for the cost of gasoline sold to boats at private marinas. This is the first fuel price hike since 1983 and may gradually extend to the wider population as the government tries to lessen the cost of its energy subsidies. Although Bahrain’s government revenues are expected to drop by about one-third this year due to the low price of oil, this may well be an opportunity for the state to push for much-needed structural reforms in the energy sector, cutting fuel subsidies and introducing limited taxes.

Much like its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) counterparts, Bahrain provides a variety of economic benefits to its citizens in the form of public sector employment, social welfare, and subsidies on goods and services. Such channels and mechanisms for the distribution of oil revenue are crucial to ensuring political stability and allegiance to the regime. However, with the remarkable economic growth rates and population boom of the past decade, increasing domestic consumption is straining the state’s capability to provide infrastructure, housing, and subsidies. The amount spent on the security sector—which forms the largest share of Bahrain’s budget—is also poised to expand as the government continues to curb popular unrest.

To address these challenges, Bahrain has opted to reach for the lowest-hanging fruit by curtailing fuel subsidies. Other more far-reaching forms of recurrent expenditure, such as public sector wages and government services, are more politically binding. In 2013, it is estimated that Bahrain spent about one-third of its state budget (or 9 percent of GDP) on food, fuel, and utility subsidies. These subsidies are unsustainable at a time when public debt is expected to surpass 50 percent of GDP this year. Currently, fuel subsidy cuts are directed at industrial users and thus the social impact is minimal, but cutting subsidies to individual consumers and households will carry a substantial political risk. One possible alternative to the current universal subsidy program is to adopt a system of direct transfers to low income segments, for example as applied in India.

Bahrain’s government revenues, on the other hand, depend to a large extent on global energy markets. In 2013, 88 percent of state income came from crude and refined oil exports, three-quarters of which were from the offshore Abu Safa field, shared with and controlled by Saudi Arabia. Dwindling oil prices will reduce government revenues considerably, but the broader effects on economic growth should be mild, as Bahrain’s oil sector is the smallest in the region and constitutes around 26 percent of GDP. Not only does oil represent 75 percent of all exports, but it also constitutes about half of all imports because Bahrain purchases crude oil for refinement at market price from Saudi Arabia. The recent fall in prices will reduce both the export and import bill, so the net effect on trade should be minimal.

Though GDP growth in recent years has been mainly driven by non-oil sectors such as manufacturing and retail, Bahrain’s tax policy is still in its infancy, and this growth is not reflected in state finances. The reliance on oil income is exacerbated by diminished government revenues from non-oil sources—a result of trade liberalization and the privatization of certain government services. There is urgent need for the state to seek and pursue alternative sources of income through taxes and fees. The GCC economies have discussed implementing value-added taxes (VAT) across the region, and declining oil revenues present an opportunity to muster political backing for the project.

Value-added taxes can be designed effectively and introduced at low levels to minimize the negative impact on socially vulnerable groups. For example, food and essential goods can be exempt while higher tax rates would apply to luxury goods and excess consumption. Moreover, Bahrain is reassessing the fees charged on certain government services, for example adding a healthcare cost of 72 dinars ($190) per year on foreign residents’ visa fees. Though raising fees on the expatriate population is more politically acceptable at the moment, fees on providing services to nationals should gradually be increased as well. Bahrain and other Gulf economies have historically been averse to levying taxes and fees, which prevents these countries from reaping the benefits of their economic diversification.

The current parliament is avidly pro-government, as opposition societies have boycotted the most recent elections. Therefore the state will find it easy to pass unpopular legislation in the short term. In the long run, however, subsidy cuts and tax policy reforms will require the support and backing of broader segments of society. The success of economic reforms hinges on the political climate and the social contract between the state and its citizens.

The country was able to implement similar politically risky projects before. In 2008, Bahrain introduced taxes on businesses employing foreign workers, aiming to reduce the wage gap and encourage the private sector to hire nationals. The fees collected were allocated to the state budget and used to train Bahrainis for high value-added jobs. At the time, conservative elements of the regime and the business community fought vehemently against imposing the tax. But the changes were approved, as al-Wefaq, the largest opposition society, backed the strategies developed by the Crown Prince and Economic Development Board. The government was willing to work with opposition movements and made it obvious how the tax revenue will be spent to benefit the local working class—and future reforms should adhere to a similar framework. However, the labor tax was suspended in 2011 (and reinstated two years later at much lower levels) as a way for the regime to punish al-Wefaq and its supporters while strengthening its position among business and expatriate circles.

Cutting subsidies and enforcing taxes will require the state to extend some forms of representation and public participation in policymaking. As it stands, however, the state’s control over civil society is tightening, and political opposition societies are facing a public backlash following their decision to stay out of the parliamentary process. The regime should instead recognize that it needs to offer political concessions in order for economic reforms to emerge in the coming few years.

As Bahrain heads for a sizeable fiscal deficit in 2015, the state can capitalize on the decline of oil prices by cutting wasteful spending on subsidies and increasing revenues through taxes and fees. This will require the government to make swift and decisive economic reforms in the coming months. In the long term, Bahrain needs to address the fiscal sustainability of its current social contract through meaningful political discourse.

Abdulla Abdulaal is a PhD candidate at the School of Oriental and African Studies. His research interests include the economic history and political economy of the Arab Gulf states.

This article has been republished from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s website.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect that of the Bahrain Debate’s organising body. 

Does my surname really sound that bad? Absolutely not. It’s lovely. The problem lies in the social construct within which it is the designated author of my truth. I am always a subject of my family. There is no escape. Whether my family likes it or not, they are as accountable for what I say and do as I am.

When did I come to notice how problematic that is? When I experienced what it’s like to not be identified with my family. This was my most valuable experience as an undergrad back in London. There, nobody knew or cared about who my family is. There, I experienced what seemed to me like absolute autonomy. When I held bigoted views against non-Muslims as a newcomer, it was me who was bigoted. Not my family. When I chose to identify as a humanist two years later, it was me who was a curious skeptic. Not my family.

Enjoying autonomy from the family institution, as opposed to the default subject of its orientation, is both emancipating and enabling. It emancipated me from the many imaginary self-imposed shackles, and it enabled me to restructure my identity from scratch, away from the gaze of a society that would cruelly turn back to my family and shout: “you did this! You made her reject the Default!”

One must not dare reject the Default, for the Default is what reproduces and sustains society generation after another. Of course, every society has a default, for it is simply a kinder word I use to describe the dominant ideology, whatever it may be. According to French Philosopher Louis Althusser, what sustains the reproduction of the dominant ideology, is the various state apparatuses, both repressive and ideological^[1]. The Repressive State Apparatus (RSA), as the name suggests, is the authority that enjoys a legal monopoly over the use of repression in order to keep things ‘in line’. The Ideological State Apparatuses (ISA) on the other hand, includes institutions such as the school and the family, and they are a bit tricky. These do keep things in line with the Default too, but they do so rather indirectly, and sometimes unconsciously.

All apparatuses sustain the reproduction of the Default through what Althusser calls ‘interpellation’. Interpellation is the process by which the Default constitutes your identity through its various institutions in line with its needs. It organizes and situates you in society as either subject A, B or C; it all depends on the identity you must uphold in order to keep the Default from collapsing. The moment you’re born, you’re therefore already ‘interpellated’ as a subject of the Default through your first encounter with one of its most powerful apparatuses: family.

I am sure my family does not actively think of ways to sustain the Default. Yours definitely does not either. Interpellation does not happen like that. It happens very subtly, through a complex ideological construct.

The Default where I come from denies access to the Political from those marked female for gender. Note here that the Default should not be mistaken for the legal system, as there are no laws that restrict women from political participation. The kind of access female are denied is rather social; it is a product of the cultural imagination. How that came to be requires historical investigation that many feminist thinkers have attempted. What is critical to my discussion, however, is how my interpellation as a subject of the family institution in the local context excludes me from active political participation. Here’s how.

The Default had situated me somewhere between the private and the passive public spheres, primarily through my family. I am hidden from the active public sphere, namely the Political. What then can represent me in the Political is my surname; it becomes the author of my truth. The quieter I am, the louder my surname represents me. What happens when I become vocal? I co-write my family’s truth. Even worse, as I trespass into the wilderness of the Political, the burden of ‘honour dependents’ makes me vulnerable to predators.  What an easy target you are when you have so much to lose from a single ‘honour’ strike, whether based on truth or lies.

I love my family enough not to want them to suffer the consequences of my distanciation from the Default. I am not exactly an activist; I am just a vocal observer. But that is enough for me to become somebody’s target if my observations systematically target the Default, and I fear they do.

They should not take the blame because they were not the cause. But that does not matter; I am ‘theirs’. My family takes the blame only in the sense  my interpellation as their subject was nurtured since I was born. “You’re a girl” I was told, “you’re the frontier of our reputation. If you ruin yours you ruin ours”. Why must I carry the burden of everybody else’s reputation and not just mine? Why is my mind everybody else’s property and not just mine?

In societies where the current Default was yet to be introduced, i.e pre-capitalist societies, women were far more involved in the production process that marked the heart of the public sphere. They were not only mothers and helpers; they were crop-growers, teachers and Goddesses too. Life activities such as reproduction, raising offspring and seeking entertainment in pre-Default society were not separated from labour activities. Sociologist and Philosopher John Holloway tells us that the moment life activities were separated from those of labour as we entered the domain of the Default, subordination of life activities consequently led to the subordination of women^[2]. Patriarchy did exist in feudal society, but as the two activities were intertwined both physically and psychologically, women could not be isolated from the active public sphere. Once labour was isolated from the social life and moved inside factories, a new hierarchy between men and women came into being and denied the latter direct access to means of production and consequently, decision-making.

Establishing the new hierarchy required redefining what it means to be a woman and what a woman can and cannot do. These new shackles were not only imposed on her doing, but also her body; and the two came to be one and the same. When she sought control over her doing, she was a witch and her doing witchcraft; when she sought control over her body, she was (and is, in today’s society) a slut. The retribution over deviation of the new ‘normal’, the new Default, had to be violent if it were to forcefully assign particular identities to its subjects in order for them to sustain it. The ‘honour’ culture is just one manifestation of the bloody misogyny through which the new order came into dominate.

Although such functional misogyny manifests itself in the education system and the labour market, it is nowhere more visible than within the family apparatus, often using the aid of patriarchal interpretations of religion. One can observe how it functions in scenarios many of us are familiar with, like telling a female that if she deviates from the ‘norm’, no man would want to marry her. Or telling her that she should listen to her older (and sometimes younger) brother because he’s a man. Or that in the absence of a servant, she should help her mom clean the dishes, not her equally capable brother.

Having developed a keen interest in the intersectionality of oppression, and poststructuralism a couple of years ago, my sister and I started a movement against patriarchy in the house, and we were relentless. Our revolution ultimately overthrew the system. At last, I am able to dress as I please without having my brothers perceiving it an attack on their manhood. I am now able to make crucial decisions in the house that carries heavier weight than most my siblings’, and even write this piece with their blessings!

We were not granted such freedom easily nor through our conservative society. A feminist revolution had to take place inside the house; concepts had to be redefined, history of social relations rewritten and a new egalitarian system constructed from scratch in which I am in control of my body and my mind. Such effort that breached the normalization process my family, and consequently my sister and I were undergoing, had wielded us a powerful shield against strikes that could one day target my family if I were to step into the wilderness of the Political, facing the Default both unarmed and unstoppable.

If my family came to accept that unless they force me to be their subject, I cannot co-write their truth, maybe as more and more feminist revolutions take place within our households before they take place in the broader society, the latter will eventually cease to point fingers at the wrong traitor of the Default’s many codes of conduct, our families. And maybe turn back to us, female comrades, and concededly mumble: fine, you can take back what’s yours.

 Sources: 

^[1] Althusser, Louis. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. Lenin and Philosophy and    Other Essays, Ben Brewster, trans. Monthly Review Press. 1971.

^[2] John Holloway. Crack Capitalism. New York: Pluto Press. 2010.

Dabya Al Rafaei has a BSc in Economics and Political Science from Queen Mary, University of London. She tweets at @Dabyaaa_

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect that of the Bahrain Debate’s organising body. 

Is there Hope for Equal Political Representation? 

 Bahrain has already been suffering from political corruption prior to the popular uprising in 2011. When it comes to elections, the government favored individuals loyal to them and helped maximize their chances by simply endorsing them in comparison with government opponents.  Latifa Al Qaoud is one of the first two women to ever run for elections. She ran in 2002 in the Southern governante, the same district Mariam Al-Rowaie ran for in the following years.  Al Qaoud was named a strong candidate partly because the King’s wife, Sheikha Sabika, publicly expressed her desire to include women in the government. Despite her chances in 2002, she lost to the same religious cleric Jassim Al-Saeedi who went up against Mariam Al-Rowaie in 2006 and 2010. After her loss in 2002, Al Qaoud ran again in 2006 representing a different district, and won. This could be considered a small victory for female politicians, however it must be noted her two opponents had dropped out before the election date, making her the only candidate. The district she ran for was Hawar, an isolated uninhabited island. In 2010 she won again in the same district, but had no competitors during the entire campaign period. Mariam Al-Rowaie, who lost in both 2006 and 2010 elections says Al Qaoud’s breakthrough was a result of the government’s endorsement, which advised her to run in an unpopulated area. Having an expert advice that guides a candidate to maximize their winning opportunities is beneficial, but only few are privileged enough.

A Side Track to Equality

“Before the uprising, one of the challenges for women compared to men was the social barrier. There was always the social stigma or mindset against women. Even if they [men in the society] say they are for equal opportunities, deep inside their heads – and we could feel this in their articles, speeches, election campaigns and discourse of religious clerics – they are not,” explains board member and Deputy Secretary General of National Democratic Action Society (WAAD) Farida Ghulam.

 But Bahrain hit a turning point in political development and human rights when it witnessed a popular uprising calling for more freedoms and political reforms. Tensions between opposition and the government started in August 2010, and escalated to a popular uprising in February 2011. Since then, the line between genders have slowly blurred, and the gap between men and women started shrinking until they were almost equally bad.

 Women played a significant role in Bahrain’s uprising, standing in the front lines besides the men to demand political and civil rights. The events of the uprising changed the social reality in Bahrain, placing the challenges women had been facing up until the uprising on the shelve. The focus shifted towards addressing shared grievances including human rights violations, political corruption and social divisions. Women’s participation forced a wider acceptance by religious leaders and political societies. They have earned their spot in the society, gaining the support they lacked, and the acknowledgment they missed. However, rising up to being an equal partner in the struggle brought new challenges.

 When Muneera Fakhro,  Vice President of WAAD, ran for elections in October 2010, her campaign banners were taken down from the streets. The banners said “The mother land is a responsibility, enough corruption” reflecting WAAD’s mission to combat financial and administrative corruption. The municipality responsible for that area informed Fakhro it had received orders from high authorities to remove the banners.

 Fakhro says, “now it’s not a matter of gender, it depends on what kind of men or women.” Four year since the uprising, she says the main challenge right now has more to do with whether an individual is a member of the opposition or a government loyalist. Opportunities and chances are presented to those who support the government.

 Wajeeha Al-Baharna, president of the Bahrain Women’s Association, notes one of the uprising’s dangerous products is the spread of sectarianism. Sectarianism is an agonizing split between the two main Islamic sects in Bahrain, the Sunnis and the Shiites. In a country where the majority of its population are Shiites ruled by a Sunni royal family, most of them are considered to be anti-government, while most of Sunnis are considered to be government loyalists, of course with some exceptions. “Even women themselves, due to this dispute and sectarian tensions, they are not on the same page anymore. Women are divided. Things have been infected by sectarian disease, and this affects our work on women issues,” Al-Baharna admits.

 A study in 2012 on the uprising by Magdalena Karolak echoes the notion of social divisions and splits, and she categorizes people -including women-  into pro and anti government groups. She also explained it is difficult to predict how permanent any of the changes are, until they’re tested on the ground after serious political changes take place, leaving the future of women in Bahrain unclear. Karolak claims even though women played a major part in the uprising backing up the democratic movement, they might “find themselves marginalized after the political changes have taken place.”

Need For Policies:

The Supreme Council for Women is an official governmental body whose mission is “to empower Bahraini women and integrate their needs in development to ensure the sustainability of her family stability and familial bond.” Fakhro, who is also one of the founders of the council says although it was a promising initiative for women in Bahrain, the council’s role has become weak. It is technically an extended branch of the government headed by the King’s wife. This makes it exclusive to women preferred and hand picked by the government, and limiting its services to a small group of the society. “It doesn’t harm women, but it doesn’t change anything either. The women in the council will never criticize the government. They’re just an appealing body for the western part of the world to show that our government is modern,” says Fakhro.

 However Al-Rowaie thinks the government holds a larger responsibility to craft policies into active laws. “The society will then gradually accept it, because it serves as a credit policy that can be gradually implemented without pausing the process or go backwards,” she says.

 Absence of a Quota System

The responsibility doesn’t fall merely on the government’s shoulders, empowering women in civil society is rather a shared responsibility. Women rights activists in Bahrain have been calling for the United Nations recommendation that were adopted at the conference on Women in Beijing, to be implemented and that includes the quota system.

 There are three types of gender quotas, two are on the constitutional level which are “reserved seats” and “legal candidate quotas”. While the first sets aside a specific number of seats in the parliament for women, the latter sets a minimum for women’s representation. The third type is a voluntary measure endorsed by political parties to set a minimum for the share of women on the candidate lists. Al-Baharna, whose association, along with other women’s associations, support the quota system says she is surprised despite calls for democracy and gender equality, some political societies don’t take the initiative to implement these measure. Political societies, being the gatekeepers to gender balance in political decision making, play a crucial role. “This is a contradiction, they should review their policy and show more support for women. Its an embedded culture, the men are dominating in these positions, not only in political societies. Their ideas are not reflected on the ground,” Al-Baharna elaborates.

 The quota system however raises some concerns to one of the most liberal groups in Bahrain, which did not adopt the quota system. Farida Ghulam of WAAD says there was a split within the group. Some women within the group opposed the idea claiming there is no need to make it a law, instead just work to increase the percentage to half, in alliances with the UN’s recommendation.

 But that’s not the only concern, implementing the quota system may do more harm than good says Ghulam, explaining it might pave the way for unqualified candidates to reach the top, and reflect a negative image of women. “We don’t want to vote for women just based on their gender. We want to vote for a person who shares our political interests and goals, whether it is a man or a woman.”

However Al-Baharna refutes this argument claiming there are many qualified women not only in WAAD, but in the entire civil society who could fill these seats. Meanwhile, Mariam Al-Rowaie, who is also the former president of Bahrain Women Union, has an in-between opinion on this measure. She says the quota system is only a tool, and a temporary measure that could help Bahrain take baby steps towards gender equality in politics, but it should not be the only way.

Getting to The Root of The Problem

Bahrain Women’s Association works from within, adopting an inside-out approach to tackle what they believe are the main causes for women’s issues. Women empowerment lies in working on the “roots rather than the symptoms” says Al-Baharna. To have a long term effect on how women see themselves, the association focuses on following a proactive approach rather than fixing the problem later. It starts with the way children are brought up and the ideas and practices they get accustomed to. It’s a problem, she explains, if children open their eyes and realize there is discrimination against women and mothers don’t do anything about it.

“We try to educate women and change their paradigm. Instead of listing their rights, we start with self-esteem and help them build their leadership skills, so they start appreciating themselves and don’t feel inferior.” This method, she believes, strengthens women’s confidence, and prepares them to participate and stand strong against all symptoms. Al-Baharna explains “If the woman believes in herself she will be ready in politics.”

There is Hope

Given that Bahrain is known for its economic growth and women’s’ active role in that field,

the paradox of women being active in the economic sector but not so much in politics is not necessary a bad sign. Former member of Parliament of Alwefaq National Islamic Society Matar Matar concludes that productivity of women in the economic sector is almost equal to that of men’s, and in other sectors women are more productive.

“This economic contribution will automatically have its impact on the nature of this male dominant mindset. This is what makes me optimistic, we will see more representation of women in public affairs,” he says.

 Although the 2011 uprising in Bahrain is slowing down the political development and empowerment of women, putting the future on an unpredictable shaky path, hope is still there. When asked about the future of women’s political presence, Al-Baharna took a deep sigh and a moment of silence. “It’s painful to think of the answer, if you had asked me this question in 2010 I would have said it’s a great future.” However she believes Bahrain is unique because of the hardships people go through that is bound to shape the country’s future. “I saw many women from  some  GCC countries, and asked them, ‘why don’t you demand your right for political participation?’ They ask me ‘why should we?’. The way I see it,  money takes over rights.” She explains that Bahrain does not have an oil boom, and the society is not very wealthy. Such conditions make the people more independent and persistent  to overcome obstacles and  gain their human rights. That serves as an advantage rather than a disadvantage, Al-Bahrana concludes:

“Challenges create opportunities. Unless we have challenges, we will not develop.”

Faten Bushehri is a Bahraini freelance journalist and rights advocate. Global Voices contributor and GV Check Desk editor. Current MA student in media and politics. She tweets at @Fatenhbu.

Anne Koopman is a Dutch Freelance Journalist, currently pursuing MA in Journalism, Media and Globalisation with focus on media and politics. She tweets at @koopman_anne.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect that of the Bahrain Debate’s organising body. 

The Bahraini Society: Challenging Women’s Political Presence

Women’s role in the political scene in Bahrain is not as widespread as one would expect it to be. Statistics suggest despite government laws being in favor of women’s participation in politics, the number is still considerably low. The changes modernization has brought to the region conflict with the traditional values and social behaviors the area had deeply rooted. The process of modernization moving towards the Middle East and the region, created artificial societies with a modern surface, without solving modern dilemmas.^[1]

Although the laws for political involvement in Bahrain open the doors for women, the way to reach leading positions is considered much more difficult for women than for men. President of the Bahrain Women’s Association Wajeeha Al-Baharna refers to these female specific challenges as the “triangle of oppression against women,” which she argues include politicians, religious figures, and social norms and traditions. We further explain these angles in three main causes: Bahrain’s male dominated society, religious influences and political societies’ lack of endorsement for women.

Male Dominance

A couple of days after the elections in 2006, Mariam Al-Rowaie asked a female friend about the candidate she voted for. The woman confessed she voted for her male opponent Jassim Al-Saeedi, explaining she was pressured by her eldest son. She told Al-Rowaie “My son told us, ‘They want us to let a woman speak in our name? That’s the end of times.’ My family and I didn’t have a choice, we couldn’t break his word.”

Despite the open minded and socially advanced reputation Bahrain enjoys, the mindset of male dominance is an embedded culture and strongly present in the upbringing. Al-Rowaie’s conversation with the woman shows how members of the society not only are against females being in leading positions, but also how women can sometimes place themselves in the passenger seat, as followers rather than leaders.

Nada Alwadi, an independent Bahraini journalist and researcher on women’s issues in Bahrain, says this is especially evident in rural areas and villages. “I see these people respect women, because they see them everywhere in society. However, Even though they feel women can play an important leading role, they will never vote for them and always prefer a man.” With men in leading positions, women have different roles, Al-wadi explains. “It is expected of women to be stay-home mothers, raise and take care of the children. They argue, when is she even going to have time to participate in politics?”

A study by Magdalena Karolak from the New York Institute of Technology shows this environment makes some women resistant to jump into politics. Some women already have little interest in taking part in politics, and the lack of support by society isn’t exactly encouraging.

To top it off, networking has become a privilege more for men than women. Political gatherings and discussions are mostly held at night, when male guardians restrict their women from leaving the house at a later hour.  Other gatherings take place at mosques, where men and women are segregated. Al-Rowaie explains how her opponent, being an influential religious figure, used his mosque to preach and ask for votes. “These platforms are available for men all year round and not only during that one month before casting the ballot. Women don’t have these platforms which limits their chances.”

Religious influences

In an attempt to gauge public reactions to her campaign’s events and speeches, Al-Rowaie assigned some of her staff members to monitor conversations taking place where people gather, usually in a traditional café, ‘Gahwa’.  A monitor reported back an exchange between men who attended one of her speeches and men who didn’t. The conversation revolved around whether she was dressed appropriately, or wore her headscarf ‘Hijab’ properly, rather than discussing the political agenda and policies she put forward to serve her community.

The European Parliament considers Bahrain one of the most liberal countries in the GCC in terms of interpreting and applying Islam. It acknowledges the government’s steps towards political reform in the early 90s has scaled down the influence of religion in the society. Women alongside men had access to education, and were active in the civil society.

Even though Bahrain is not a country where religion is sacredly practiced, politics and religion can not be seen separate from each other. In Bahrain, like other countries in the region, political ideas and programs are guided by Islam. That is also reflected in the dynamics of the society. The difficulty to separate religion from politics often gives religious figures political powers. Opposition groups Alwefaq National Islamic Society and government supporting group Al-Menbar Islamic Society are examples of political societies that are also Islamic. A dilemma which creates a blurred line between religion, social norms, and politics, where they all blend together and guide what has long been accepted as traditional practices.

Karolaks study also shows that in Bahrain, religion is not holding women back from making it to leading positions in politics, it is how religion is used as a tool to persuade the people.

Al-Rowaie confirms Karolaks study but disagrees with the EU notion of liberal Islam in Bahrain, “It is not the religion itself, it’s the misinterpretation of Islam, and political islamic societies’ use of religion to serve their political agendas.”

The imposition of this misinterpretation affects the way women see themselves and the idea they have of what their role should be in the society. Men, supported by religion and religious figures who are also male, use religion to their own benefit. They take advantage of some women’s lack of awareness of their rights and manipulate these interpretations to add to their oppression. This results in creating a self-image in women’s minds that reflects men’s degrading view of women’s role in the Bahraini society. ^[1]

Educated and more liberal women have troubles accepting this traditional vision of a woman’s role in the society, and seek to find a balance between modernity and traditions.³

Prominent female figure and Vice President of leftist opposition group National Democratic Action Society (WAAD) Muneera Fakhro faced a tremendous amount of pressure from her religious male opponents during 2006 elections. Members of Islamic societies tried to taint her reputation by calling her a communist and saying she drinks alcohol, a forbidden practice in Islam, to spur people away from voting for her. Despite Fakhro’s belief she was not targeted for being a woman, but because she is a member of a leftist secular group, religious figures referred to texts from the Qura’an and the Hadith and used them to lobby against women specifically, her included. Recurring ones were: “A woman’s voice is a sin”, and “A nation will not succeed if they are led by a woman.”

During the elections in 2006 and 2010, some of these parties reportedly put together a list of the most deserving candidates based on their level of faith called “Kutlat Al Eman” literally translates to the “Bloc of Believers”. In their campaigns they urged their followers to vote telling them it’s a religious duty to support these candidates.

Current member of the Nuwab, Jameela Al-Sammak, told Gulf News in 2006 when she ran for elections as an independent candidate: “I have never opposed religious scholars. But when for instance they say that Al Wefaq is the Bloc of the Believers, does that make me an atheist?”

We contacted Al Sammak for further input but she did not want to participate in this article. Our attempts to include other government responses were unsuccessful after having contacted several parliament members, but they were not available to comment.

While there is a large population of educated enlightened women, Al-Rowaie thinks some, especially those who attend religious gatherings and seminars, fall victims to these traditional ideas about women. Some women even go as far as advising other women to remain absent from the political scene, she says.

Political endorsement

With social norms and the use of religion driving the decision-making process in some political societies, the result is a considerably low level of political endorsement of women. That is, lack of support and encouragement to include female candidates within political societies’ bodies as representatives in governmental entities.

Al-Wadi says she personally remembers asking Alwefaq’s Secretary General Ali Salman why they had no women running for elections “and his answer was always, ‘well we respect women, they are very important in our society. We want them to lead, but we feel this is not the right time’.”

Former member of parliament for Alwefaq Matar Matar admits women empowerment was not a priority for his society as much as serving the political agenda. “It was not a target to have women as representatives,” he explains. While there was no VETO against women in Alwefaq, there were no active attempts to include them in the list of candidates, which affects the number of female politicians. “I don’t feel you can see a good representation for women without having explicit policy,” he says.

Matar’s colleague Afaf Al-Jamri, an active member of Alwefaq is popular amongst other female activists in Bahrain for being a qualified potential candidate. They claim she wanted to run for elections but Alwefaq stood in her way. Al-Jamri however refutes these claims saying her decision not to run for elections was a personal one, and assured the situation within the Islamic party is changing. She claims religious restrictions are slowly melting away and opening new horizons for future female candidates within Alwefaq.

What The Bahraini People Think

We surveyed 50 Bahrainis to understand what the average Bahraini thinks of this matter. Respondents were 32 women and 18 men between the age of 17 to 63. The results show what they perceive to be the top three challenges for women in politics. The female respondents believe male dominance, social norms, and political corruption are the main obstacles women face while trying to reach high positions. Interestingly, male respondents listed religious influences, next to social norms and male dominance as their top three. Both men and women listed social norms as a main factor, but women focused on the current political situation in Bahrain, while men emphasized religion to be a key challenge. The respondents also listed gender inequality, discrimination against women, lack of support, and women’s lack of qualifications or interest in politics.

Things took a different turn when Bahrain witnessed a popular uprising in February of 2011, where people demanded more freedoms and political reforms. The debate about women’s rights became no longer a priority on the agenda now that human rights in general are violated. In “Is There Hope For Equal Political Representation?” we are going to look at the consequences of the February 14 movement in Bahrain, and discuss possible solutions that could contribute to changing the future for women in politics in the country.

Bibliography

1. Seikaly, M. (1994). Women and Social Change in Bahrain. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26 (3). pp. 415-426.  Retrieved from: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=5199888&fileId=S00207438000607

Faten Bushehri is a Bahraini freelance journalist and rights advocate. Global Voices contributor and GV Check Desk editor. Current MA student in media and politics. She tweets at @Fatenhbu.

Anne Koopman is a Dutch Freelance Journalist, currently pursuing MA in Journalism, Media and Globalisation with focus on media and politics. She tweets at @koopman_anne.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect that of the Bahrain Debate’s organising body. 

The project focuses on a core set of issues which include, but is not limited to:

• Economic Participation
• Citizenship
• Political Participation (formal or informal)
• Bahraini Family/Personal Status Law
• Women and Civil Society

Suggested topics (Please contact us if you are selecting a topic from this list):

• Methods and challenges to women’s economic participation
• Legal structures and mechanisms that promote equality/inequality
• History of (gender equality) movements in Bahrain
• Formal and informal dimensions of political participation
• Women in the context of development plans

Deadline: Novermber 10th, 2015

Guidelines:

• The article should have a firm structure with clear arguments and information should be referenced where relevant. Opinions should not be stated as fact.
• The piece must be relevant to one or more of the above themes.
• A featured image relating to the written content should be included. Note: if the image does not belong to you, you must include the source.
• Contributors should include a brief author bio (100 words) and a personal photo with their work.
• We retain the right to make language and grammatical amendments to an article without changing the nature of the argument in a contributor’s piece. It will only be posted after the contributor’s approval of such changes.
• Suggestions and pitches are welcome and can be sent through to info@thebahraindebate.com directly.

Bahraini Politics: Where Are The Women?

Preparations for the 2006 parliamentary elections were anything but a breeze for Mariam Al-Rowaie, one of the first few women running in Bahrain. Leading up to the day of the elections on November 25th, she had already moved to a smaller house, took out a loan to be able to fund her campaign, and lost her campaign’s leader when he was arrested and jailed by the government. She had spent a significant amount of time networking to win people’s support and attention from a location barely big enough to be considered the campaign’s headquarters. She chose to ignore occasional phone calls from her opponent’s supporters encouraging her to withdraw. She had seen text messages sent to voters by Islamists telling them it is against Islamic teachings to vote for a woman. To top it all off, she fought against bribes, turning down a tempting offer for a respectable position and a great amount of money from higher authorities, all just to prove her point. She lost the elections earning a total of 534 votes as opposed to her opponent who won with 2757 votes.

Al-Rowaie lost again in 2010. Her opponent in both years, Jassim Al Saeedi was not only an influential religious figure and had his own mosque as a platform to campaign, he also had the government’s support who allegedly favored him as a candidate. Enough reasons, she believed, to eliminate her from the scene, but that did not matter. “It was a move to show and prove women’s existence as a way to introduce the culture of acceptance, that a woman has the equal right to run for elections and have a campaign,” she said.

This is one of many stories in Bahrain where ambitious women are constantly facing roadblocks when attempting to enjoy the same privileges available for men.  In this article series we focus on what hinders women to reach decision-making positions in politics.

Going Down Memory Lane

As one of many women facing similar challenges in Bahrain, Al-Rowaie is one of the few who chose to go through the battle regardless. In 1973, two years following Bahrain’s independence, only men gained the right to vote and run for elections until the parliament was dissolved in 1975. Women were excluded(1) from this short-lived democratic election mostly because they did not get the support of both Radical and Liberal men. Despite their encouragement for women to integrate in the social change and political reform, they still showed to be conservative, excluding them from political participation. The presence of a strong “traditional tribal orientation” in Bahrain’s society at the time also played a role in limiting the liberal experience to men only.

Over time, more women were educated(1) and employed in different areas including health, education, industrial and administrative positions. By 1967 there were equal numbers of schools for girls and boys, a total of ten for each gender. In the following four years, 3.1 percent of the working Bahraini population was women. By mid 70s women proved to be very visible in civil society by joining political groups of different ideologies including the Baathist, nationalists, and radical leftist groups to further social and political aims. All these developments and improvements in education and active roles in civil society still stood before the traditional values, a taboo area that was not openly challenged.

The parliament wasn’t re-established until 2002 as part of the National Action Charter ‘Al-Meethaq’ introduced by the King. The current parliament is made of an elected house of representatives, ‘Nuwab’, and an appointed consultative council ‘Shura’. Now both men and women, have the power to elect the lower house of the parliament as well as representatives in the municipal council. Article 7 of chapter 2 in the charter states “Citizens, men and women alike, have the right to participate in public affairs and political rights including suffrage and the right to contest as prescribed by law.”

Equal Representation, Unreached Target

The Kingdom of Bahrain committed to the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action plan in 1995 to adopt the United Nations Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) 1990 resolution. The resolution put forth recommendations to increase the proportion of women in leadership positions in all political bodies. The target was to reach 30 percent of women’s representation by 1995, and 50 percent by 2000. Currently, women make up fifteen percent (12 out of 80) of the seats in the parliament, and 14.8 percent of the total ministers in the country, falling behind ECOSOC’S target. However, compared to it’s sister Gulf nations, Bahrain is still in the lead.

A Larger Picture: Where Does Bahrain Stand

Among the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Bahrain is seen as one of the frontrunners in women’s rights, and women play a  major role in the economic sector. Bahrain comes to a similar level with Kuwait, which is considered to be the most liberal in legislating rights and empowering women in all parts of society. However in Bahrain, development in women’s rights is held back by society’s politicized sectarianism between the Sunni and Shia sects. Following Bahrain is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Oman in adapting women’s rights. Saudi Arabia, whose application of the Sharia law is considered “the most intense, severe and absolute,” lags far behind. In the last years, especially following the Arab Spring in the region, small steps are taken by the GCC states to improve women’s rights. In all of the Gulf States, education is the highest developed area concerning women’s rights, with women making up more than fifty percent of all students.

Women’s movements are also a growing area, especially in Kuwait, where civil societies are becoming more successful, creating educational opportunities, and influencing the government to improve the situation for women. In other countries however, women’s organizations are seen as one of four: 1. Cosmetic adaptations to international demands 2. Only tolerated because they suit the government’s plans for development, such as the Supreme Council for Women in Bahrain, and several organizations in Kuwait, 3. Not independent from the government like in Qatar and UAE, or 4. Completely absent like in Oman and Saudi Arabia.

After Oman in 1994, Bahrain was the first of the GCC to allow women to vote and participate in politics, followed by Qatar in 2003 and Kuwait in 2005. In the UAE the royal family selects a group of people who vote for the federal National Council. Saudi Arabia is the only GCC state where women are allowed to participate in politics but cannot vote. In 2011, the country introduced a quota of twenty percent representation of Saudi women in the Shura council appointed by the King. In 2004 Bahrain was the first country to appoint a female minister, soon to be followed by other Gulf states, and in 2006 the country appointed its first female judge. Right now, Bahrain has the largest proportion of women in ministerial positions.

Table 1: The proportion of women in the parliament and holding ministerial positions

Source: European Parliament, Inter-parliamentary Union/UN Women Watch

With the exception of Kuwait, Bahrain unlike other Gulf States still has few upper-class women in high administrative posts. However their limited number make them symbolic rather than representative(1).

Why is it still a problem?

The achievements Bahrain has accomplished might have put women on the right track towards equal rights. However the legacy of women having few personal and civil rights is still haunting them. Although many women in the Bahraini society have risen to the occasion, some women, especially in villages are still not fully aware of their rights, and are yet to be equipped with the full knowledge and courage to fight for those rights.

So why is the representation of women in the political scene in Bahrain still marginal? In other words, why is the number of women who currently hold decision making positions still considerably low?

Bahrain’s record of political and social development was still unable to erase other deeply rooted influences. The male dominant mindset combined with the widespread religious influences present women with different roles than those of men, leading to the lack of endorsement and support by political societies.

How do these challenges hold women back from taking risks and moving forward? We will have a deeper look at the root of these causes and how they influence women’s roles in the political scene in Bahrain in “The Triangle of Oppression: Challenging Women’s Political Presence.”

Bibliography

1. Seikaly, M. (1994). Women and Social Change in Bahrain. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26 (3). pp. 415-426.  Retrieved from: http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=5199888&fileId=S00207438000607

Faten Bushehri is a Bahraini freelance journalist and rights advocate. Global Voices contributor and GV Check Desk editor. Current MA student in media and politics. She tweets at @Fatenhbu.

Anne Koopman is a Dutch Freelance Journalist, currently pursuing MA in Journalism, Media and Globalisation with focus on media and politics. She tweets at @koopman_anne.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect that of the Bahrain Debate’s organising body. 

Date: March 28, 2015
Time: 6:30PM-10:00PM
Location: Al Oruba Club, Juffair

Moderater: Dr. Omar Al Shehabi, Director of the Gulf Centre for Development Policies.

Speakers presenting at the event include:

• Rashid Al Jassim, Leader in the Al Fateh Youth Coalition and Researcher and Acadmic
• Ahmed Abdulameer, Head of the Youth Office and member of the Political Office at National Democratic Action Society – Wa’ad
• Salman Salem, Ex-MP of Al Wefaq Islamic Society

Topics discussed:

Political Economy

The impacts of the fall in oil revenues

Question: What is the the main cause of the current economic crisis (rise in living costs, unemployment, housing crisis)?

Public lands; land reclamation and its impact on society

Question: What is driving spatial transformation, land reclamation and abuse of public lands, and to what extent can this be considered positive/negative?

Question: Do you believe that Bahrain Vision 20130 is the best solution for Bahrain’s economic challenges? What is the best solution, in your opinion?

Policy, State and Society

Sectarianism and the definition of citizenship

Foreign labour and demographic transformations

Question: What are the causes of sectarianism in the country? What is the solution?

Question: What is the solution to overcome the current economic crisis? Is it economic, political, local, regional?

Alshehabi utilises the concept of the spatial-fixes of capital (literally how space can be altered to further capital accumulation) conceptualised by both David Harvey and Adam Hanieh. Harvey’s ‘spatial fix’ refers to the process of primitive capital accumulation, where capital creates new space for it to operate through the construction of infrastructure, land, factories and so on – such in the case of land reclamation. In addition to that, Hanieh suggests that the creation of a global space for labour in the GCC is a ‘spatial fix’, as much as it allows the state to not exploit its citizens hence minimising any threats that may occur from rising class-consciousness  (where labour is essentially imported from a diverse selection of nationalities). Hence the local/foreign divide, which has only been aggravated by political naturalisation, is rather obviously an effort led to further segment society.

However one may note that while the analysis of Alshehabi arrives at a conclusion which quite rightly characterises the uneven and combined development in Bahrain, it seems to lack a wider focus on intersectional issues – issues that run across gender, class, ethnicity and so on. For example, Alshehabi provides no analysis whatsoever of female labourers due to the observation that expatriate men outnumber women by 3 to 1. This disregards the fact that domestic help in Bahrain (mostly imported labour) faces structural violence to say the least, that even the country’s labour law does not address directly (resulting in exhausting working hours).

While putting in mind the argument made by Ghandi (and others) which suggests that the ‘Western Civilization’ – alternatively, capital – displaces women from their homes into the productive sphere, one may find the need for another dimension of a spatial fix of capital, namely the ‘intersectional spatial-fix’ of capital, where the displacement of labour from its ‘space’ into that of the capitalist is viewed within the context of the intersectional system. That has been specifically true in Bahrain where colonial efforts at educating women and setting up the first primary school for women in 1928 resulted in a significant number of females being employed by the private sector by the 1980s; essentially displacing women and economically empowering them to sell their labour. The state has portrayed itself as a benevolent protector of women’s rights (as it does with any other segmentation in society), yet such a claim becomes difficult to validate when considering the case of family law.

The case of family law elucidates the varying levels of oppression and exploitation a Bahraini woman faces when filing for a divorce. While the state has lead an effort to codify family law, only the Sunni section of the law has been passed and the Shi’a section was abandoned due to a very reactionary countermovement from Shi’a scholars and the Al Wefaq opposition bloc. The Shi’a Ja’fari courts are riddled with rumours of outright exploitation and corrupt judges, where judges have allegedly placed a conditionality in some cases that the woman – especially when economically disempowered – has to temporarily marry them (muta’a marriage) in order to get divorced. The muta’a marriage itself is rather controversial, where many take to the claim that it is simply prostitution under a religious cover. On the other hand the codified Sunni law only gratifies that the law is coded, not just – where for instance in specific cases women have to pay their previous life partners the sum of the dowry if they wish to get a divorce. On a similar note, male MPs who ran for the recent elections have promised to end the ‘problem of spinsters in society’ – which only proves the extent of which the use of (in this case political) power is used to subject women and limit their life choices. Therefore an intersectional spatial-fix may prove to be a useful tool to arrive at a holistic understanding of development in Bahrain, and the varying forms and levels of exploitation.

To conclude, it would be worth  mentioning that I have selectively chosen concepts from Alshehabi’s analysis – and would encourage all to read the journal article to get a wider understanding of the topic. The proposed third dimension of a spatial fix of capital (namely the intersectional spatial-fix) elucidates the varying forms and levels of oppression that exist within the society and could provide a more holistic account of the uneven and combined development in Bahrain. The radical spatial-demographic transformations over time that Bahrain has endured has not only been projected through the recent elections, but also – as Alshehabi suggests – have caused much of the political upheavals leading up and following the uprising in 2011.

Mohamed Aldaaysi is part of the organising team of the @Bahrain_Debate. He is also pursuing a BA in Politics and Development at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Mohamed tweets at @MDaaysi.

This article has been republished from the LSE’s Middle East Centre Blog.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect that of the Bahrain Debate’s organising body. 

Anthropologist Henny Harald Hensen ran into few issues when she visited Bahrain in 1960 and  lived in Saar for three weeks, where she studied the people there. Saar was then a small village of about 450 inhabitants, and geographically smaller than the more cosmopolitan Saar of today. It is one of the oldest inhabited locations of the island located in the west. Now inland, it was probably once on Bahrain’s sea-front, and a Dilmun-era temple is located on its outskirts.

Saar’s oldest families are all Sayyids (direct descendants of the Prophet), and indeed all the people that Henny met, who she lived with and who acted as her interpretors, were Sayyids. It was something they took great pride in.

Henny provides a snapshot of the rural life of Bahrain which has all but vanished in the 21^st century. She describes, for example, the disappearing “local handicrafts”: the mat-makers of Sitra; the cotton weavers of Bani Jamra; and the potters of A’ali who used converted Dilmunian burial mounds as kilns.

On the subject of the potters, she describes the way they built these furnaces: “To make a kiln out of a burial mound a hollow is made in the top, and another in the side. The objects to be fired are placed in the upper one, while the other is filled with firewood. The fuel is dried palm leaves and used in such quantities that the dark smoke from the kilns in the burial mounds can be seen from far away like flowing black banners.”

In Saar, however, no one worked in local manufacture. All the men of Saar worked in the oil fields. The Bahrain Petroleum Company (BAPCO) offered the first modern full time employment in Bahrain, but according to Henny employment at BAPCO had a “quite unexpected effect.” At the time, BAPCO had froze the workers’ wages, and as the cost of living rose, the living standards of the whole village had “lowered alarmingly.”

The sleeping arrangements for infants reflect that low living standard. Cradles are foreign to Bahrain and need to be imported, at the time probably coming from Europe. Young “Sayed Aloy”, 22, and his wife seemed to be the only family in Saar in possession of one. The other families “wrapped their babies in long cloths and laid them on the couch of rags directly on the floor.” It was a simple way of life.

It’s an era of Bahrain’s history now gone. In the information-technology era, few of us could imagine the labourious work of the village craftsmen. Nowadays, too, most of our worldly possessions and food are imported from abroad, not processed from the neighbouring village – though back then, they were already importing some things. Henny tells us of non-perishable butter, dihn, which was imported from the Netherlands. One of Saar’s men would buy a great tin from the Manama souq, and his wife distributed it to the women of each household.

Henny witnessed a part of life common to all Muslims which is also disappearing. She was still in Saar when, on a February evening, she watched one of the village men travel up a small hill – it was one of the ancient burial mounts on the west of the village. “From this vantage point he carefully watched the setting sun in order to be able to shout as soon as he caught sight of the fine crescent of the new moon, thus heralding the beginning of the month of Ramadan.”

In Saar, Henny also witnessed the Shi’a side of Ramadan, that is, the mourning of the assassination of Imam Ali. A mulla from a neighbouring village stayed in Saar for three nights, and over the course of his stay “he would conjure up before the eyes of his audience with the poetical power of his words the whole sanguinary drama which deals with the assassination of Imam Ali.” For the Shi’a, it is a tragedy second on to the death of his son Hussein. Interestingly, Henny rates the mourning for Imam Ali as as the “most important function of the month of Ramadan” in Saar.

The village of Saar, as she found it, was on the cusp between the traditional rural Bahraini way of life, with the villagers’ lives rotating around their Shi’a Muslim faith, and the encroaching modernity, most obvious in the village’s total dependence on BAPCO for employment. Saar, writes Henny, “defended the values of religious status and was obliged to defend them in order to maintain its identity as an entity surrounded not only by representatives of the orthodox Islam, the Sunni, but also by the representatives of victorious Western industrialism.”

Thus ends Henny Harald Hansen’s Investigations in a Shi’a village in Bahrain, published by the National Museum of Denmark, Copenhagen, 1968, in its Ethnographical Series Volume 12. Her report forms an interesting snapshot of a Bahrain long gone. It was one of the earliest, if not the very first, anthropological studies of Bahraini life, and probably not the last.

There is something uncomfortable about reading a foreign anthropologist’s analysis of Bahraini life, as it feels like we are diminished to the level of an animal, to be remarked at as though in a David Attenborough wildlife documentary. Yet it also makes fascinating reading, capturing us from an angle we can never observe ourselves from.

We all like to be talked and discussed about, and Bahrain is a country which draws the fascination of many people from the outside. There is something about our little islands which capture the imagination of others, and maybe it is because Bahrain is so tiny that its people are so varied and rich in the flavour of life.

We should not discourage academics who step into our homes and try to understand us. They might just capture a snapshot of Bahrain which, just like the lives of Saar’s old villagers that must have seemed so permanent, will surely disappear one day.

Ali Al-Jamri studied MA Near & Middle Eastern Studies at SOAS. An enthusiast in history, any time he has to spare he spends reading and writing about the blog on his blog, alialjamri.wordpress.com.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect that of the Bahrain Debate’s organising body.